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Floyd v. Lykes (Cont.)
ISSUE: Is it proper for a ships captain to perform a burial at
sea, without prior notification of the next-of-kin, when the vessel
is eight days from port?

twenty hours from port when the burial was effected. Other
than this easily distinguishable case, the only authority to
support defendant's claim was a publication by the United
States Public Health Service entitled The Ships Medicine Chest
and Medical Aid at Sea. That handbook contained the statement
"[t]oday burial at sea is the exception". But no expansion of this
statement was offered, leaving the reader inconclusive as to
whether the meaning was that death at sea was the exception
today due to advances in medicine and technology, or that lack
of embalming and mortuary facilities was the exception, etc.
Thus the plaintiffs case failed for lack of any evidence in support
of her cause of action.
In affirming the lower court's decision the court of appeals
noted that plaintiff offered no statutes, cases or authorities to
contradict Brambir's holding, that nothing in the Death on the
High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§761-68, or the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§688,prohibited burial at sea,and that no abuse of discretion on
the part of the captain had been demonstrated. the court in
sinuated that certain proof not present in the instant case might
have allowed the action to go forward. Examples of such facts
were if the ship had embalming and mortuary facilities (vessels
refrigerated food locker not appropriate),or if the plaintiff had
demonstrated both a willingness to reimburse Lykes for its
expenses for an unplanned docking at a closer port plus the
willingness of the port country to accept an unembalmed
cadaver, or if the captain's decision could be classified as "ar
bitrary, fanciful or unreasonable".
Harold Levy '90

ANALYSIS: Plaintiff argued on appeal that state tort law
established a quasi-property right to the body of the deceased in
the next-of-kin and that state law was or should be incorporated
into the general maritime law. Agreeing that maritime law
applied and citing Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323
F.2d 257,259 (2d Cir. 1963),cert denied 376 U.S. 949 (1964),the
court held that it could "look to the law prevailing on the land"
only when the maritime law was silent. Absent a maritime
statute, the case should be governed by general maritime case
law, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409
(1975); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160-61
( 1920), and state law may not be applied where it would conflict
with maritime law, Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v. Petty Ray
Geophysical, 783 F.2d 577,582 (5th Cir. 1986).
The court looked to Brambir v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 37 F.
Supp. 906, 907 <S.D.N.Y. 1940), affd mem., 119 F2.d 419 (2d
Cir. 1941), as the leading case on point. In that case a passenger
died eight days from port and the court held that the ship's
master had absolute discretion over the fate of the corpse.
Further,burial at sea is recognized as a viable option by master,
vessel and medical guideboo ks.
Defendant cited Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N.Y.
249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917) to support its case. There, defendant
provided an embalmer and morgue and additionally, was only

SCAC TRANSPORT (USA) INC. v. S.S. DANAOS
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 25 Aprill988
845 F.2d 1 157
A stevedore whose negligence has been determined to be the proximate cause of the litigation can be vouched into
arbitration proceedings without its consent and be bound by the findings of the arbitrator.
FACTS: The S.S. Danaos was loading cargo on a vessel when
an accident occurred wherein the vessel's Stulken Boom collapsed
when a pin in a winch block failed during the loading of a water
tank truck. The truck, boom and parts of the vessel suffered
damage. The vessel, owned by Danais Shipping Company
(Danais),was under a time charter to Big Lift USA,Inc. and Big
Lift Shipping Company (N.A.) Inc. (Big Lift), collectively which
had contracted with Universal Maritime Service Corp. (Universal)
for the stevedoring services.
The truck's owner SCAC Transport (SCAC) commenced this
action against Danais, Big Lift and the S.S. Danaos in rem.
Danais cross claimed against Big Lift for indemnity. Universal
was brought into the action by a third party claim and was cross
claimed for indemnification by Big Lift. SCAC settled with
Danais. Pursuant to the charter-party between Danais and Big
Lift any dispute was to be arbitrated in London. Universal was
not a party to this agreement.
Big Lift tendered the defense to Universal with regard to the
London arbitration and required Universal to appear in defense
of the action and to indemnify Big Lift. Universal was advised
that refusal or neglect of the notice would bar it from objecting to
the outcome of the arbitration.
The arbitration ruling was in favor of Danais, and the steve
dore's negligence was found to be the proximate cause. Damages
included vessel repairs, loss of charter hire, interest and at
torney's fees. Universal again declined to assume the defense,
when Big Lift informed it that an appeal before the Commercial
Court in London was to be heard. After Universal declined to
assume defense of the claim and prosecution of the special cases,
Big Lift instructed its London solicitors to terminate appeal. Big
Lift then commenced an action in the District Court.
The District Court, affirming the finding of the London arbit
ration as to negligence, found that Big Lift was entitled to
indemnity. The damages awarded, however, did not include
attorney's fees becuase the court determined they were beyond
what Universal could reasonably contemplate when hired as a
stevedore.
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ISSUE:
Whether a stevedore without its consent may be
vouched into an arbitration where the stevedore is the charterer's
indemnitor?
ANALYSIS:
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court and held that absent a particularized
showing of prejudice,a stevedore may be vouched into arbitration
under a charter party by a charterer where the stevedore is the
charterer's indemnitor. The district ' court's decision as to attorney's fees was reversed.
Under the common-law practice of voucher, a defendant or
indemnitee who seek s indemnification from a third party or
indemnitor must serve a notice to defend on the third party. This
notice informs the indemnitor of the action against the de
fendant and offers the opportunity to defend the action.
If the defense is not assumed, the defendant may bring a
separate action later to recover its indemnity. The indemnitor
can dispute the existence and extent of the indemnity. See
Humble Oil & Ref Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co.,
444 F.2d 727 (3rd Cir. 1971). The third party will be collaterally
estopped from relitigating issues decided in the first action in all
of the elements of the adjudicatory procedure are met.
Arbitration is cited as an important, efficient and equitable
means of dispute resolution when arbitrators are experienced in
maritime matters and the evidence is extensive. The Second
Circuit noted the procedural aspects of arbitration and court
adjudication and concluded contrary to the district court's rul
ing that the notice received by Universal had no preclusive
effect; that absent a particularized showing of harm,procedural
differences between arbitration and the judicial process are not
grounds for denying a preclusive effect to vouching in notice.
Universal did not demonstrate any prejudice suffered as a result
of the London arbitration.
For reasons of efficiency vouching is permitted. Stevedores
are well aware that charter parties contain arbitration clauses
to which they as potential indemnitees are bound. Absent a
(Continued ...)

SCAC v. SS Danaos (Cont.)
showing of prejuduce there is no reason to subject a party to
multiple proceedings.
The court concluded that a stevedore must indemnify a ship
owner or charterer to whom it has contracted to provide
stevedoring services for losses that party sustains from the

stevedore's breach of its warranty of workmanlike service. See
Saks Infl Inc. v. M/V Export Champion, 817 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.
1987). This obligation of indemnity extends to litigation ex
penses incurred by the shipowner in defense of any suit brought
against it as a result of such breach.
Melanie A. Wood '90

OLIVERI v. DELTA STEAMSHIP LINES, INC.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1 June 1988
849 F.2d 742
The same preset value discount rate used in diminishing awards for future pecuniary losses should be used in diminishing
awards for future pain and suffering.
FACTS: A licensed third assistant engineer brought an action
against the shipowner, Midland Ross Corporation (Midland),
under the Jones Act to recover damages for injuries to his foot
suffered while working on a vessel. The district court admitted
testimony by a union representative as to the probable loss of
future wages and promotional benefits of an average new
member. The judge instructed the jury that it did not have to
accept the testimony and also that it was to render an unadjusted
award for both future pecuniary and non-pecuinary loss. The
jury awarded $240,000 for lost future earnings and $50,000 for
future pain and suffering. The judge subsequently deducted 2'k
from the award for present value discount purposes. Delta ap
pealed on the grounds that evidence regarding Oliveri's future
earning capacity was improperly admitted and that the present
value discount calculation was incorrectly performed.

ment over the period the plaintiff would lose his expected wages.
Given this, the amount that the jury awards is deemed as taking
the discount rate into consideration. However, if by party stipu
lation the discounting is left to the judge then the court must
instruct the jury not to incorporate discounting in their calcula
tion. The judge will calculate it using the 2% per year standard.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff shows that the jury, despite the
instructions of the court, incorporated the discount rate in their
final award the judge had to accept this and not further di
minish award.
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's determination
of a one time, 2% reduction of the jury award for non-pecuniary
future loss. The court acknowledged that several older decisions
from this circuit held contrary to imposing any kind of reduction
of lost future non-pecuniary gain. See Alexander Nash-Kelvinator
Corp., 271 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1959); Yodice v. Koninklijke
Nederlandsche Stoombot Maatschappij, 443 F.2d 756 (2d Cir.
1971); and Rapisardi v. United Fruit Co., 441 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir.
1971). However, starting with Chiarello v. Domenico Bus Service
Inc., 542 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1976), the court stated that "disCount
ing was not only appropriate but preferable." /d. at 886. lnMetz v.
United Technologies Corp., 754 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1985), the court
set the rule that the discount rate used would be below the rate
used when calculating lost pecuniary expectancy. "All that is
essential is to reach a result that properly takes into account the
time value of money." 764 F.2d at 68 n.3. The court, allowed the
29l- reduction in the award to stand. Recognizing the discrepancy
with the majority of other circuit and state courts, it went on to
say that "[i]f we were writing on a clear slate, we might be
inclined to accept the view of the other circuits and reject any
discounting of future non-pecuniary losses. However, we are ob
liged to reckon with the clear preference for discounting expres
sed by this circuit ..." 849 F.2d at 751.
The court allowed the award to be diminished in an express
attempt not to prejudice the plaintiff here by ordering a new trial
on this issue as well. The defendants, in trying to get as large a
present value discounting as possible will seek to keep the calcu
lation away from the court, and to present the jury with as high
discount rate figures as possible in order to minimize the final
award. Injured plaintiffs in seeking higher awards will try to
have the court decide the issue. It seems that given the court's
rationale, the acknowledgment of its minority view, and its in
terest in keeping uniformity throughout the circuits, the court
may be persuaded to follow the majority view in the future and
not allow present value deduction on future pain and suffering
losses.
Kimon C. Thermos '90

ISSUES: 1. Is testimony from an official of the union, which
the injured plaintiff was barred from joining, admissible as
evidence to ascertain the lost expected earnings?
2. Whether the same present value discount value
rate employed in diminishing awards for future pecuniary los
ses should also be used in diminishing awards for future pain
and suffering?
ANALYSIS: 1. The Court of Appeals admitted the testimony
as evidence stating that the court has wide discretion in deciding
to admit testimony of any witness. Admissions of such testimony
will more likely be upheld when the evidence used to establish
lost future pecuniary gains is backed by empirical evidence such
as wage scales and contracts of employment.The data presented
to the jury must be sufficiently clear so that the jury could
reasonably assess the plaintiffs chances of promotion and sal
ary incrementation over the years. Furthermore, the court must
clearly instruct the jury that they may disregard any parts of or
the entire testimony of a witness.
2. The Court of Appeals remanded to the lower
court only the issue of the proper calculation of the discount rate
for future pecuniary loss, holding the lower court erred when it
reduced the jury award by a one time flat 29l- deduction from the
total amount. The court cannot take away this prerogative from
the jury without stipulation from both parties. The Court of
Appeals did not find such stipulation, and therefore the issue of
the present value discount to be deducted was to be retried
before a new jury. This amount would be deducted from the
lump sum award of the previous jury.
The two components to this deduction are the projected infla
tion rate, and the projected rate of return on a risk free invest-
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